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Dieska: Faith and Reason' in the Life and Philosophy of Jacques Maritain

"Faith and Reason" in the Life
and Philosophy of Jacques Maritain
(A commemorative study on the occasion of his ninetieth birthday)

Joseph 1. Dieska

On November 18, 1972 the cultural and Catholic world paid tribute to one of the
most outstanding contemporary thinkers and religious leaders, Professor Jacques
Maritain. It is the purpose of this paper to outline some basic features of what
seems to be the central and fundamental problem in the entire life and philosophical endeavor of Professor Maritain. This problem, known from the history
of philosophy as the problem of "faith and reason" or the problem of the relationship between supernatural and natural theology, has been debated throughout
the centuries, in particular after the oncoming of great Christian controversies
and polemics with various heretical and non-Christian thinkers and writers. It was
originated by the first writers of the Patristic era and continued throughout the
centuries to come.
Not until the great theologians and philosophers of the stature of st. Anselm
of Canterbury (1033-1109) and the contemporaries of the two great figures of the
XIII century, i.e. St. Bonaventure (1221-1274) and st. Thomas Aquinas (1225-1274)
have brought the whole issue to its theological profundity and philosophical complexity, was the relation between faith and reason considered to be of major
importance for Christian theology and the religious .life of all orthodox Christians.
Although the official Church adhered firmly and without interruption to the texts
of the Bible from which it followed that such truths as, for instance, the existence
of God, can be known from reason, there were some recognized theologians who
sympathized with the view later known as fideism, according to which the knowledge of supernatural truths is directly dependent on the supernatural light granted
to human intellect by the grace of God as a renumeration for the virtue of faith
possessed already. Such a semi-fideism was believed in, according to the scholars,
by st. Bonaventure, John Duns Scotus, and others. It was also present in the
ontological arguments of st. Anselm, whose adage "fides quaerens intellectum"
used to be heard very often during the medieval argumentations of the theologians
belonging to various schools and religious Orders.
The most illuminating contribution to the problem from the point of view of the
scientific concept of theology (Scientia sacra), as well as from the point of view
of the philosophical understanding of the human nature as conceived within the
so called Aristotelian-Thomistic metaphysics and psychology of knowledge, was,
however, made by st. Thomas Aquinas. In his Summa Theologica, Thomas presented the issue with an undeniable vigor and depth no theologian or philosopher
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before him can have possibly done, St. Augustine not excepted. Thomas affirmed
the dependence of faith, as the knowledge from and by Revelation on our natural
intellectual knowledge so categorically, that it was almost impossible to weaken
or attack his arguments. Positing the so-called rational praeambula fidei as the
" condicio sine qua non" of Christian theology, Thomas was in fact the first
philosopher for whom the problem of a proper relation between theology and
philosophy meant the central aspect of Christian apologetics understood as
"apologia" or defense of revealed faith . In order to deter educated Christians
from the danger of a vicious circle, while they were proving the authenticity of
Revelation by and from Revelation itself, Thomas practically introduced for the
first time the genuine method called later on Theologia naturalis-Natural theology.
This was and remained the most valuable significance, as far as philosophy is
concerned in the entire Thomistic synthesis.
Thus the Middle Ages, Christianity, and Thomism became virtually inseparable
from one another and the official Church had to accept the theory of the rational
justification of faith in order to secure the unity of Christendom on the one hand,
and the stability and intelligibility of Revelation on the other. Thomas also provided the answer to another question that vexed the minds of theologians, i.e. the
question of mysticism. His answer, briefly said, consisted of an introduction of
the so-called mystical theology, which in his mind, could be conceived as a
parallel way to God and by different methods. However, mystical theology had
to be controlled and led by dogmatic theological thinking.
The problem of "faith and reason" has assumed a new significance with the
rise of Protestantism (1517). In their refusal to accept Thomistic Intellectualism ,
Protestant theologians have once and for all espoused the most radical form of
fideism, which dominates Protestantism till this day with some recent exceptions.
Martin Luther (1483-1546) , Philipp Melanchton (1497-1560) and their followers
declared the Scripture to be the only guide and source of our knowledge concerning faith. Luther's war cry "Scriptura sola " and his negative attitude toward
"natural reason", which he labeled "a whore" , best characterized the antiThomistic and anti-Intellectualistic way of thinking and feeling . The general
theological and philosophical atmosphere which prevailed in the Protestant circles
during 1he period between XVII and XIX centuries was fideistic through and
through. It was weakened, however, by the rise of the new empirical sciences
at the beginning of the XVII century, in particular astronomy (Galileo Galilei 15641642) and physics (Tycho de Brahe 1546-1601 and Johann Kepler 1571-1630) which
culminated in Isaac Newton (1642-1727) and his exact mathematical formulations
of some laws of physics governing the material universe.
The theological and philosophical impact of the new sciences was a separation
between theological thinking and scientific and philosophical interpretations of
reality. An abyss has been created between faith, Revelation, Scripture and
reason, science and philosophy, the consequences of which abyss made themselves
radiantly manifest in the last and in our present centuries. Sciences and modern
schools of philosophy became totally opposed to the dominant role and privileged
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position of Revelation and theology over and above the natural reason and empirical methods used by sciences. The crisis climaxed in the Darwinian discovery
of evolution or rather in the findings that were being used to prove the evolutionary
theory in biology (1859). Charles Darwin (1809-1882), originally a devoted Protestant, avoided any religious, theological fight. At the same time he was fully
aware of the impact of his theory upon faith, the reading and exegesis of biblical
texts and the conclusions and inferences new scientific theories in astronomy,
geology and biology forced theologians and philosophers to draw from now on.
Thus a widely spread polemical controversy-in words and on paper-took place
in the second half of the XIX century, not only in En.gland but also in Germany
(Ernst Haeckel), France and in other parts of the scientific world. The confidence
in the Bible has been, if not completely lost, certainly has been shaken to its
foundations in the scientific circles of the time.
The Christian faith of the European believers has been thus challenged not only
by different opinions and disagreements of theologians, or different philosophical
attitudes, but also by the positive scientific facts, which Auguste Comte (17981857), the founder of Positivism, has chosen to be the only basis upon which
contemporary philosophy must build its Weltanschaung or world view. The
influence of Auguste Comte was, naturally, strong first of all in his native country,
France. But together with the influence of evolutionistic theories which were
combined by the English philosopher and sociologist Herbert Spencer (1820-1903)
into the universal system of Evolutionistic Positivism capable in his view of
explaining all fields of human knowledge, the Positivism of Comte became a general
characteristic of modern man's intellectual thinking.
From this point of view we must judge the situation in which the religious ,
theological and, in particular, Christian faith found itself in the decades and years
when Professor Jacques Maritain was born, grew up, and matured in the very
heart of France, cradle of Positivism and Naturalism, the capital of his native
land, Paris.
Those who are familiar with Maritain's religious, mental and philosophical
development, will agree with our choice of the topic for this solemn occasion,
when a philosopher of Maritain's significance has reached his ninetieth birthday.
In all his activities literary, educational, or in positions he has held in public life,
Maritain manifested his central interest in the relationship between his faith and
the natural order of the world knowable by natural, logical and empirical methods,
and without the help of supernatural grace (the "unaided intellect").
There was in Maritain's personal life a very psychological and perhaps even
ethical reason for this centrality of the problem in question. Being born into a
family with strong Protestant, anti-Catholic, liberal and freethinking bias in the
midst of the social environment which only his native city Paris could offer at
the end of the last century, Maritain experienced the deepest conflict of the two
worlds, Le. the world of ath eism and theism, from his earliest childhood. This
conflict occupied his brilliant mind and led him after years of searching for
Truth and God, into the small church of st. John the Evangelist in Montmartre,
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Paris, where he and his wife Raissa Maritain (by birth a Russian Jewish refugee)
together with her sister Vera received the sacrament of baptism and thus were
received into the Catholic church in the presence of the famous French writer
and Catholic thinker, Leon Bloy (1846-1917) as their godfather, on June 11, 1906.
Maritain's conversion to Catholicism, however, was not simply an event of
personal religious significance. It took place during the years of a tremendously
fervent intellectual, cultural, and literary struggle for the victory of the traditional
spirituality of the French genius and against the atheistic, agnostic, and positivistfc
tendencies permeating all sectors and walks of life. In this regard, then, Maritain
served as an example to all those who observed his intellectual fight with himself,
with his family, with his environment, and later on with his teachers and educators
in the classroom, in particular, after he enrolled at the famous Sorbonne in order
to study philosophy and natural sciences (biology).
In Maritain's college years the university life in Paris was dominated by professors who represented the blending of Naturalism and Positivism, mentioned
above, with a strong emphasis on antireligious, antidogmatic thinking of the so
called "elite" representing the French "esprit national" in literature and in other
branches of the Fine Arts (Hyppolite Taine, Emile Zola, Ernest Renan). And it is
through Maritain's personal and literary contacts with these circles that his conversion was not only influenced but was also influencing younger generations
toward the remarkable "Catholic revival" and "Spiritual Renaissance" in the first
decades of this century. Not only was Maritain considered a philosopher who
represented the Catholic philosophy of Thomism, but he was regarded as one
of the most influential forces in literature, arts, and literary criticism around whom
gathered such famous figures as Charles Peguy, Ernest Psichari, Jean Cocteau
and a group of younger men of "letters". Let me quote here the most touching
description of Paris in this regard by Raissa Maritain in her Memoirs We Have
Been Friends Together :
"I cannot write your name, without a deep homesickness, without an immense
sadness ; you whom perhaps I shall never see again, you whom I have perhaps
left forever .
"You who fed me with truth and with beauty, who gave me Jacques, and my
godfather Leon Bloy, and so many precious friends who made radiant the days of
our life there. Oh, city of great sorrow and of great love! Who could speak worthily
of the injury done to you? For such, a David or a Jeremiah would be needed.
City defenseless when it was needful to defend you with the arms of this world,
which no one had known how to prepare for you; but city imperishable and
powerful in the works with which you have enriched the earth, in the saints
with whom you have peopled heaven ; oh, symbol of beauty; oh, monument of
Christendom! City of great sin, also-but who is without sin? City where good
had the advantage of evil, and truth of error; capital of liberty. You whose air
is so light and whose grey sky so soft; whose delicate symphony of monuments
tells with such discreteness so long, and tragic, and marvelous a history! Oh, city
of St. Genevieve and of Saint Denis, city of Psichari and of Peguy! City of Racine
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and of Pascal, of Saint Vincent the Paul and of the Sisters of Charity. City of
glorious poets and painters, city of Victor Hugo and of Baudelaire! City of the
Concorde and of the Champs Elysees, city where Saint Thomas taught, city where
Saint Louis reigned, city of Notre Dame! Most precious jewel of the world's
beauty, what king's, what ransomed people's crown will you adorn? Oh, may it
be the King of Peace and of justice, a people of humanity and of wisdom! And
may God soon lift you up from the depths of your humiliation."2
But Maritain's conversion had also strictly philosophical, rational, and scientific
roots; the roots which Maritain discovered in the study of the structure, meaning,
and performances of the processes taking place in the physical world of matter,
as described by contemporary sciences and equally in the phenomena purely
immaterial, physical, and spiritual, ontologically different from the former. And
perhaps here is the place to mention that, in the opinion of this writer, it was
this philosophical insight not acquired by any knowledge through "connaturality"
(cognitio per connaturalitem) in which Maritain otherwise firmly believed, but
exactly by a deeply logical and analytic method applied to the phenomena observed, that is responsible for his adamant refusal of non-Thomistic philosophies
and for his devotion to the Catholic faith. Maritain, while in Paris, was at the
start strongly influenced by Henri Bergson (1859-1941) who was at that time the
only professor among non-Catholics who opposed in his books and lectures at
College de France the positivistic and materialistic theories whose upshot was a
crude monism not only in physical sciences but also in psychology, sociology, and
general philosophy. Maritain visited Bergson's classes at the neighbouring College,
although his Alma Mater was Sorbonne, dominated by Leon Brunschvicg, Levy
Bruhl, Emil Durkheim, and learned from him that the monistic solution contradicts
experience and analysis of such phenomena as is memory, intuition described as
"intellectual sympathy," and in biology the phenomenon of life itself.3 Having
studied during his sojourn in Germany with the famous biologist and philosopher
of the so called Neo-Vitalistic School, Hans Driesch (1867-1940)4, Maritain accepted
Bergson's dualism, although later he opposed his favored teacher on several issues
connected with Bergson's sharp anti-intellectualism and unjust criticism of conceptual and scientific knowledge. Maritain retained the dualistic metaphysics and
psychology, however, defended it by the Thomistic arguments based on the old
Aristotelianism and on contemporary scientific observations and logical inferences
from them. And it was in this dualism that Maritain was saved from the fashionable materialism, physicalism, and positivism of his college years. Maritain points
to this influence of Bergson in the Preface to his first major philosophical work
Bergsonian Philosophy and Thomism as follows:
"It was in 1908-while I was deliberating, in the country around Heidelberg,
whether I could reconcile the Bergsonian critique of the concept and the formulas
of revealed dogma, that the irreducible conflict between the " conceptual" pronouncements of the religious faith which had recently opened my eyes, and the
philosophical doctrine for which I had conceived such a passion during my years
as a student and to which I was indebted for being freed from materialistic ideals,
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appeared to me as one of those only too certain facts, which the soul, once it has
begun to admit them, knows immediately it will never escape. The effort, unobstrusively pursued for months, to bring about a conciliation, which was the
supreme object of my desire , ended abruptly in this unimpeachable conclusion. The
choice had to be made, and obviously this choice could only be in favour of the
Infallible, confessing therefore that all the philosophical toil which had been
my delight was to be begun again. Since God gives us , in concepts and conceptual
propositions ... truths transcendent and inaccessible to our reason, the very truth
of His divine life, that abyss which is His, it is because the concept is not a mere
practical instrument incapable in itself of transmitting the real to our mind, whose
only use is in artificially breaking up ineffable continuities, leaving the absolute
to escape like water through a sieve. Thanks to analogical intellection, that natural
marvel of lightness and strength which, thrown across the abyss, makes it possible
for our knowledge to attain the infinite, the concept, divinely elaborated in the
dogmatic formula, contains but does not limit, and causes to descend in us, in an
enigmatic and mirrored but altogether true manner the very mystery of the Deity
which pronounces Itself eternally in the Uncreated Word, and which has been told
in time and in human language by the Incarnate Word . . . We must therefore
conclude that there was at the outset of the Bergsonian assault against carnal
reason some fundamental misconception . . ."5
Those who have enough philosophical training will agree that the above quotation reveals not only Maritain's attitude toward Bergsonian criticism of conceptual
knowledge, but also Maritain's deep philosophical insight into the essence of the
problem of the relation between faith and reason, which is in this text described
in an almost theological and not only in a metaphysical manner.
The above quoted lines were written in 1929 for the second edition of his work.
And it is worth mentioning that Maritain, by his own confession, had not known
Thomistic philosophy at the time of rejecting Bergson's anti-intellectualism. He
writes in the same passage:
" ... the concept was made the normal vehicle of rationalism-therein lies the
crucial error; the affirmation of the ontological value of the intelligence and of
its statements was confused with the helplessness of a sterile intellect eager to
submit all things to its own level. That much I learned in too certain a fashion ever
to forget it. If all that is desired is to seek a compromise, one can always arrive at
conciliations in words, at diplomatic appeasements: those who have understood
the real antinomy will never accept them. Nor was I at that moment familiar with
the works of Saint Thomas. As far as I was concerned it was upon the indestructible
verity of the objects of faith that philosophical re fl ection rested in its effort to
restore the natural ordination of the inteIIect to being, and to recognize the ontological genuineness of the work of reason. In thus completely accepting without
quibble or reserve, the authentic reality value of our human instruments of cognition I was already a Thomist without being aware of it. When a few months
later I came upon the Summa theologica its luminous flood was to find no opposing
obstacles in me."6
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Many years later (1945) Raissa Maritain, while remmlscing on the days at
College the France and Jacques' and her first and consecutive meetings with Bergson in his classrooms, she refers to this same matter as follows:
"Thus there was always present within us this invincible idea of truth, this
door ajar on the road of life; but until the unforgettable day when we heard
Bergson, this idea of truth, this hope of unsuspected discoveries had been implicitly and explicitly frustrated by all those from whom we hoped to gain some
light . . . We found the philosopher in the full flush of his youthful glory . . .
With Peguy, Sorel, and Ernest Psichari, we came early to be sure of having seats
... These numerous listeners did not come through snobbery as one might be
tempted to believe, but were guided by a sure instinct; and we were doubtless not
the only ones to whom Bergson gave intellectual joy in restoring metaphysics to
its rightful place.
Several years later, while studying the nature, the life, and the function of the
intelligence, and noting that Bergson's criticism was really directed only against a
misuse of the intelligence and against an enormous rationalist and scienticist metaphysics, Jacques was to part company with Bergson on this point. But Bergson's
teaching in its positive aspects supplied for us the very possibility of metaphysical
work ; and on the negative side it unmasked the sophisms on which the mechanistic
and materialistic theories were founded, sweeping from the philosophical terrain
a great number of pseudo-problems and false solutions. "?
But the split between Maritain and Bergson was not tragic at all. For all that
spiritual and religious crisis through which both of these great searchers for Truth
went until they found it, was the necessary step toward the final victory. Both
Maritain and Bergson converted first philosophically, later on also religiously
toward Christianity at least in their acceptance of basic Christian views on God,
the Creator of everything, who was a personal, absolute being as against their
former entanglement in pantheistic "elan vital" described by Bergson in his works.
As for Maritain, the conversion was almost immediate after they visited with
Leon Bloy between the years 1904-1906. It is interesting to point out how the relation between the supernatural faith and rational philosophical struggling of the
intellect was an important factor in this personal endeavor to find the Supreme
Being and the true religion. Raissa Maritain, who followed her young husband on
this journey, describes the first flashes of faith as follows:
"We reserved to ourselves the examination together at home, of these data on
the life, the doctrine, and the sources of Catholicism. We felt a certain humility at
our incredible ignorance of this complex world of religion, whose beauty began to
unveil itself to our eyes. We weighed against it the things that science offers as
most certain, the philosophical discoveries of Bergson, our most constant and
deepest aspirations . .. Little by little, the hierarchy of spiritual, intellectual, and
scientific values was revealed to us, and we began to understand that they could
not be inimical to each other. In varying degrees all participate in the mystery in
which science finally ends, all participate in the light from whence descends
all knowledge. And we saw clearly that the truth of one could not be the enemy
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of the truth of the others. Once we recognized as inoperative the objections of
rationalistic skepticism and pseudo-scientific positivism, which, in destroying the
value of reason, themselves destroy the value of every argument situated within
their frame of reference and directed against the affirmation of a religious absolute,
once this was recognized, the veracity of faith became a plausible hypothesis. We
thought that Faith itself could be considered as a higher gift of intuition, and that
by invoking the idea of an absolute truth, faith would imply and permit the elaboration of a doctrine of knowledge which would assure the human intelligence its
grasp on reality."8
II. Maritain and the "Mystery of Faith"

We have mentioned before that in the history of Christianity and in the development of the problem "Faith and Reason" there were some great minds who were
entangled in the difficulty of the so called fideism. The same difficulties were to
be overcome by Maritain and his wife Raissa. She puts it succinctly 'in her
memoirs:
"Thus neither our interest nor our difficulties consisted in the solution of the
objections which are raised to the indivisible whole of Catholic doctrine. The
difficulty was in entering into the mystery proper to this doctrine; in finding the
center around which all the rest is organized and oriented. The path of religious
experience was out of our reach, since it presupposed faith. And how could we
adhere to dogmatic propositions which presuppose a rational inquiry, and the
content of which, we were told, although superior to reason, is supremely reasonable, but to which one adheres only when motivated and illuminated by faithtan adhesion of a unique kind, foreign to any form known to us, whether philosophical, scientific, or simply of opinion."9 For the time being Maritains have
solved their difficulty through an extraordinary interference of Leon Bloy, a man
whose "faith was all he had." And through such a concrete, practical, and
unswerving faith in the Catholic church, they were brought to Catholicism.
"So months were to pass, and we might have been permanently halted by these
insurmountable difficulties if Leon Bloy had sought to use with us an apologetic
of demonstration. On what bases? Our reason was equipped to destroy, not to
construct, and our confidence in reason, as well as in historical criticism, was very
much shaken. But he did not even think of such a thing. He placed before us
the fact of sanctity. Simply, and because he loved them, because their experience
was near his own-so much so that he could not read them without weeping-he
brought us to know the saints and mystics."lo
The personal acceptance of Catholic faith, however, did not as yet mean for
Maritain the solution of "faith and reason" problem taken generally, philosophically, and theoretically. It had to be worked out on a completely theoretical,
epistemological, and metaphysical basis for which Maritain at that time had not
sufficient knowledge. The psychological awareness of the fact that divine grace
tUnderlined by tbis writer.
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is needed in order to accept religious faith manifested itself with both Maritain
and his wife Raissa very concretely, as we could read in the lines by Raissa
quoted above. But even this awareness needed to be justified philosophically.
Maritain considered the problem to be central for the entire field of philosophy
right from the start of his philosophical career. He was guided by the idea of
explaining the relationship between faith and reason in almost all of his earlier
and latest monographs. He returns to the same question with new vistas and
affirmations of its importance not only for individual problems of human existence, but equally, if not even more so, for all mankind as concerns its behavior,
meaning, the ultimate goal and destiny in the natural as well as in the supernatural order.
Thus, when he analyzes in his political, or social philosophy and philosophy
of history different phenomena, he, with almost an overscrupulous sensitivity,
makes the importance of supernatural faith to weigh upon all human affairs.
And he does so because, as a Christian philosopher, he cannot conceive of any
philosophical problem that would have no connection with Christian supernatural
faith or Revelation from which as the only source the concept and definition
of the term Christian and Christianity must be derived. Even the essence of
Christian philosophy as distinct from non-Christian ways of thinking, must lead
to faith, because it is the revealed faith and its basic truths which determine
whether a philosophy is Christian or not. And for Maritain the existence, necessity, and validity of Christian philosophy is the most decisive question for every
Christian philosopher. Thus we see him involved in the sharp polemics with those
who, following naturalistic and positivistic philosophers, belittle, deny, or attack
the idea of Christian philosophy as such.
Maritain also derives from the problem of "faith .and reason" the important
relation between theology and philosophy, which is, as a matter of fact, but a
newer formulation of the problem "faith and reason" arisen after the methodological discussions among modern philosophical and scientific schools came to
existence. And the only satisfactory solution of this problem Maritain finds in
the solution given by his master-philosopher st. Thomas Aquinas. It is the
Thomistic solution which in Maritain's mind has not been overcome or improved
on since this great Christian genius has presented it in his Summa Theologiae. It
is not because Maritain followed blindly Thomas Aquinas that he assumed upon
hims elf the so called odium of being called a Thomist. But it was because of his
own independent reflections and studies of various philosophers and because
of the comparison he made between them that Maritain found the truth he was
searching for in the answers of st. Thomas. And it is in this sense we must
understand the statement "Woe to me, if I do not Thomistize."11
It is true, Maritain follows the logic and argumentation of Thomas, but he puts
them in a new, modern, and contemporary setting. His language is often adjusted
to the philosophical expressions used today. His arguments are aimed at and
against the modern and recent objectors and critics. And above all, when he
speaks of the necessity of taking faith and supernatural, revealed truths into
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consideration while solving the political, social, ethical and esthetical difficulties
and "crises" of our time, Maritain must transcend Thomas and go much farther,
not, of course, in essential, immutable, and universally valid principles but in
their applications to the new, different and more complex situations and issues.
In these new approaches lie the tremendous responsibility and significance of
Maritain's Thomistic solutions, proposals and often even sharp and merciless
criticisms of the "evils of our time."
In all such situations Maritain follows but one idea, i.e. the idea of the inseparable unity and interdependence between supernatural faith and natural reason,
discursive, intuitive, or evaluating, when it deals with values. Because he is and
must be a Christian philosopher, his "mixing" religious issues with nonreligious
problems, of which methodological "crime" Maritain is only too often accused,
his solutions and analyses must be what they are and what they stand for. And
in this firm attitude is Maritain's timeliness and the timeliness of his Thomism
most impressive.
It is proper that we quote now a few statements Maritain has written at the
beginning of his career and some from his last two books that have been written
after the conclusion of Vatican II, on December 8, 1965.
Maritain, while describing the character and historical importance of Thomas
Aquinas, points out those aspects of his contribution to Christian history which
have helped clarify the errors of some Christians in regard to our central problem
of "faith and reason". Thus we read in his st. Thomas Aquinas :
"The self-styled Augustinians of the thirteenth century, attached materially
to the letter of their master, commingled the formal objects of faith and reason,
of metaphysical wisdom and the wisdom of the saints: in short, they tended
toward what we would today call anti-intellectualism. What were they doing in
this , if not refusing the rights of the truth of the natural order? This tendency
was to end later in formal heresy, with Luther and his inhuman hatred of
reason. The Averroists, in their fanatical devotion to an Aristotle corrupted by
the Arabs, disregarded the proper light and the primacy of faith and theology:
in short, they tended toward rationalism, refusing the rights of supernatural
truths. And we know very well to what this tendency was to lead. 8t. Thomas
crushed them both, and he will crush them again, for it is always the same
battle. And at the same time he determined with definite principles the rational
theory of that distinction and that accord between the natural order and the
supernatural order which are integral to the Catholic Faith, and more important
for the life of the world than the cycle of the stars and the seasons."12
And speaking of the essence of the problem "faith and reason," Maritain writes:
"Truth cannot contend against truth , for this would be to tear to pieces the very
first principle of reason; and the theory of the double truth, invented in the
Middle Ages by the Averroists and taken up again in our day by some "modernist"-the theory according to which the same thing can be true according to
faith and false according to reason, or inversely-is a pure absurdity. "Although
faith is above reason," the Vatican Council declares, "yet there can be no
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genuine disagreement, between faith and reason; for it is the same God who,
on the one hand, reveals the mysteries and infuses faith into souls and, on the
other, has endowed the human mind with the light of reason, and God cannot
possibly deny Himself or the true ever contradict the true. When the vain
appearance of such a contradiction occasionally arises, it is above all because
the dogmas of faith are not understood and expounded according to the ' mind
of the Church, or because erroneous opinions are taken for affirmations of
reason. Whence it follows that: 1. Philosophy, like every science, is independent
of revelation and faith in its own work and in its principles, and develops in
an autonomous manner starting from these principles, having for its proper
light the natural light of reason, and for sole criterion, evidence; 2. Philosophy
is nevertheless subject to the magisterium of faith , every enunciation of a philosopher that is destructive of a revealed truth being clearly an error, and reason
enlightened by faith alone having authority to judge whether such an enunciation
of a philosopher (that is to say, of a man who uses more or less well natural
reason alone) is or is not contrary to faith ... 3. It is evident, from the moment
one admits the fact of revelation, that philosophy cannot suffer any harm from
this indirect subordination to faith."13
In 1966, a year after the closing of the Vatican II, Maritain published his The
Peasant of the Garonne. It was supposed to be his last work and it has attracted
the attention of everybody who knew Maritain from his long career as an international figure representing what has been labeled as intellectual Catholicism
or Catholic intellectualism. In this work Maritain restated his faith in the philosophical validity of Thomism as developed by 8t. Thomas and as rejuvenated
by himself and by those who believe that there are absolute, immutable truths
and principles. As far as our problem is concerned, Maritain touches upon it
on several occasions when he speaks of the relationship or the task and the
objectives and methods of Christian theology and philosophy. It seems that,
being aware of the so called "new" or "progressive" forces among the Catholic
and non-Catholic processualistic and evolutionistic theologians, he expresses
merciless condemnation of them and points to the importance of the Thomistic
philosophy for the theologians and for their science, supernatural theology. He
reminds them of the fact that not every philosophy is suited to be the basis
or support for the orthodox interpretation of the revealed faith, and that the
more a theologian endeavors to "do away" with Thomistic philosophical principles
in order to cater the fashionable wishes of some among the contemporary
Christians, the more he contaminates the purity of the true faith of the Gospels
and thus deviates from the magisterial authority of the infallible church, whose
duty it is to preserve the "deposit of faith" entrusted to it by God Himself.
He appeals to those contemporary Catholic theologians who are trying to
introduce into Catholic thinking, theological, philosophical or other, either the
evolutionistic ideas of the late Teilhard de Chardin, or some Existentialist
philosophers under the influence of the Protestant theological Existentialist
writers, and shows the defects and shortcomings of these philosophies. As in his
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earlier books, Maritain now declares categorically that a Christian cannot be
either a relativist. or idealist, or metaphysical monist, because it is the Faith
itself that speaks against these epistemological and metaphysical positions and
thus indirectly condemns them and forbids them. Maritain thus tackles the
problem of "faith and reason" again in the same spirit in which he solved it in
his previous works. It is from the Bible that the Christian philosopher and
theologian must learn what basic philosophical position is compatible with the
revealed faith and which opposes it.
"The subsistent Truth which is God, and which Christ came to reveal, and the
truth which is a participation in it here below-and in which we should follow,
as st. John says, and which makes us true in love (Ephes. 4,5)-and in which charity
rejoices-we see what a place truth holds in the Gospel. It is impossible for a
Christian to be a relativist. Those who make the attempt have no chance of
succeeding. Let them be pardoned, after all. There is an even better excuse than
"invincible ignorance," and that is what Baudelaire called "la betise au front de
taureau", bull-headed stupidity. But the texts we have just been reading call for
more appropriate commentary. The truth of Faith is the infinitely transcendent
truth of the mystery of God. And, nevertheless, this infinitely transcendent truth,
God has willed that it be expressed (and here come the prophets of Israel, the
teaching of Christ, and the definitions of the Church) in human concepts and
words. This is characteristic of Judeo-Christian revelation. Revelation is not unformulable; it is formed. It is so because the Second Person of the Trinity is the
Word, and because the Word was made flesh. The concepts and words that
transmit revelation to us are at once true (they make what is hidden in God
actually known to us) and essentially mysterious (in aenigmate: they remain disproportionate to the Reality which they attain without either circumscribing or
comprehending it.)
That is what teaches a philosopher to respect human intelligence, the concepts
and the other instruments it fashions in order to lay hold of things, and 'of
which the prophet of Israel and He whom they were announcing have made
use of to open doors against which philosophers bump their noses. It is in the
course of meditating on this that, once upon a time, a fervent Bergsonian began
to preceive the weakness of that critique of the concept upon which Bergson
laid so much stress, and which, after all, he himself belied in writing his great
books."14
Maritain refers here to his defense of Thomistic intellectualism against Bergson
which we discussed in our previous pages and also points out the necessity
of conceptual language prepared by philosophy (and not theology) in order to be
able to "talk theology" and thus express the revealed truths of Faith.
Only those who are familiarized with the present-day theological discussions on
" theological language" and "language about God" as conducted among Linguistic
Analysts on one hand, and some theologians, on the other, are capable to judge
the epistemological difficulties which Maritain has in mind. If we dismiss
concepts (and we must do so if we dismiss "essences") as all contemporary
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empiristic philosophers suggest, then we cannot help theology. We can save
theology by preserving them, as it is the case in the Thomistic intellectualistic
epistemology. Theology based on the so called "process metaphysics" defended
by A. N. Whitehea'd and his followers is thus doomed either to silence, or it
must express the contents of Revelation exclusively in terms and categories
prepared by Process-philosophers. In this case, however, it will never be able to
keep the contents of faith without change, i,e. it must describe them as mutable
phenomena, "events," "occurrences," etc. And this is exactly the crux of the issue,
which Maritain saw while criticizing Bergson more than fifty years ago.
It is clear from the analyses we developed in this study that Professor Maritain
is consistent today with what he was defending and believed in since his first
philosophical publication on Bergson. As a Christian philosopher Maritain was
very gratified when his former teacher and friend Henri Bergson recognized the
shortcomings of his evolutionistic metaphysics and the necessity to submit the
philosophical discoveries of natural reason to the light of Christian faith which
he almost accepted as his own shortly before his death.
Maritain has not solved the problem of fideism by dismissing reason and discursive, conceptual thinking from theology. He knew only too well that such a
solution would mean a complete sentimentalism and emotionalism in theology. He
solved the problem by accepting the Thomistic theory of the "praeambula fidei."
He also accepted the Thomistic definition of faith as an "intellectual virtue" which
saves our concept of faith from being confused with any private, subjective state
of mind or superstition. And this remains his merit in regard to the central problem
of "faith and reason" .15
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NOTES
IJacques Maritain was born in Paris on November 18, 1882. His father, Paul Maritain was
a lawyer, the secretary of Jules Favre, the grandfather of Jacques Maritain on his mother's
side. Jacques' father was baptized by a Catholic priest, however, after his marriage with
Genevieve Favre who was a strong believer in Protestantism and very anti-Catholic, he
lost his faith. Jack Maritain and his only sister Jeanne were baptized in the Protestant
church. Maritain's sister later converted to Catholicism.
After having completed his elementary education in Paris, Jacques went to the Lycee
Henri IV. After the graduation he enrolled at the Sorbonne in the school of humanities
and of sciences. He studied philosophy and biology and received degrees from both schools.
While at Sorbo nne, Maritain was also attending lectures of Henri Bergson at College de
France. After having received the degree of Agrege, Maritain took a job of editor and did
not teach in any state college because of his wish to remain independent philosophically.
Later on Maritain taught philosophy at College Stanislas and in the minor seminary at
Versailles. Since 1914 he taught at the Catholic Institute of Paris. In 1933 he taught at
the Pontifical Institute of Medieval Studies in Toronto. In 1941-1942 he taught at Princeton
University and a lso in 1948-1960. In 1941-1944 he taught at Columbia University (New York).
After the World War II, Maritain was appointed French ambassador to the Vatican in
1945-1948. Maritain married his wife Raissa Oumanssoff, a Jewish Russian refugee in Paris
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in 1904 with whom he studied at Sorbonne and attended Bergson's lectures at College de
France. They both were converted to Catholicism, were baptized at the church of St. John
the Evangelist at Montmartre, Paris, on June 11 , 1906. Their conversion was inspired mainly
by Leon Bloy their personal friend. Their spiritual and literary relationship is described by
Raissa Maritain in her memoirs We Have Beell Friellds Together and Advelltures ill Crace,
published in 1944 and in 1945. Among many distinctions, honorary degrees from universities
and scientific institutions, Maritain received for his scientific and scholarly work and for
his political mainly cultural contribution to the international organizations (UN, UNESCO)
the Medaille de la Resistance, Commandeur de Saint Gregoire Ie Grand" Commandeur de la
Legion d' honneur. He was given the Grand Croix de l' ordre de Pius IX for his religious
activities as the defender of the Catholic faith . He also won the Grand Prix de litterature de
I'Academie fran«aise in 1961 and the Grand Prix national des lettres in 1963.
Maritain has published over fifty monographs and many shorter essays, studies and
papers. He contributed to many international and French magazines and participated in
various symposia, discussions, and other programs. He is known and recognized as one
of the most distinguished lay-representatives of modern Catholicism and as the leader of
the neo-Thomistic philosophy all over the world. After the death of Raissa (1960) he
retired, moved to Toulouse and in 1971 he joined the Congregation of the Little Brothers of
Jesus with whom he now lives in Rangueil, France. His last two books are The Peasant of
the Caronne (Desclee de Brouwer, 1966) and 011 the Crace and Humanity of Jesus (Desclee
de Brouwer, 1967) .
2Raissa Maritain, We Have Been Friends Together (Longmans, Green and Co., Inc., New
York-Toronto, 1945, pp. 16-17).
3Cf. Raissa Maritain, op. cit., pp. 79-103 .
4Cf. Raissa Maritain, op. cit., pp. 180-183 .
5Jacques Maritain, Bergsonian Philosophy and Thomism (Philosophical Library: New York,
1955, pp. 16-17).
60 p. cit., p. 17.
7Raissa Maritain, op. cit., pp. 82-83, 85-86.
8Raissa Maritain, op. cit., pp. 148-149.
9Raissa Maritain, op. cit. , pp. 149-150.
IORaissa Maritain, op. cit., p. 150.
IIJacques Maritain, St. Thomas Aquinas, (The World Publishing Company; Cleveland and
New York, 1964, p. 17).
12Jacques Maritain, St. Th omas Aquinas, op. cit., p. 96.
13Jacques Maritain, St. Thomas Aquillas, op. cit., pp. 123-124.
14Jacques Maritain, The Peasant of the Caronne, (The Macmillan Company: New York, 1969,
pp.l06-107).
151n his book 011 th e Crace and Humanity of Jesus, Maritain again returns to the problem
"faith and reason": "I note in passing that the light of Christian philosophY is not, like
that of theology, the light of Faith illumined by Reason in order to enable it to acquire
some understanding of revealed mysteries, but the light of Reason comforted by Faith in
order to do better its own work of intellectual investigation: that which authorizes Christian
philosophy, at the summit of its possibilities, to concern itself according to its proper mode
with matters which pertain to theology; it remains, then, subordinated to theology, but it is
undoubtedly--on condition of being instructed by it-more open to a work of research and
of invention ; at this moment the ancilla becomes research-worker. The last word will belong
naturally to the theologian. But it is the philosopher-the Christian philosopher, in other
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words the philosopher in the state in which the concrete situation of human nature, fallen and
redeemed, requires that he be,-it is the philosopher who in such a case will have presented
to the theologian the hypothesis of research." (Jacques Maritain, On the Grace and Humanity
oj Jesus, Herder and Herder: New York, 1969, pp. 11-12).
*On Maritain's literary significance and spiritual leadership, consult the following works:
Gonzgue Truc, Histoire de la lilterature cathoLique contemporaine (Casterman, 1961);
Henry Bars, Maritain et notre temps (Grasset, 1959); La Bibliotheque de La Revue Thomiste,
"J aques Maritain, son oeuvre philosophique" (1949); Ancelet-Hustache, Jacques et Raissa
Maritain in Convertis du XXe siecie, t. I. (Casterman, 1955); P. E. Charvet, A Literary
History oj France, Vol. V. (Ernest Benn Lim: London, 1967, pp. 215, 268-269); The
Journals of Jean Cocteau, translated and edited by Wallace Fowlie (Indiana University
Press: Bloomington, 1964); E. T. Dubois, Portrait of Leon Bloy (Sheed and Ward: London
and New York, 1951); Jacques Maritain: The Man and His Achievement, Edited by Josep
W. Evans (Sheed and Ward: New York, 1963; Joseph Dieska, "The Religious and Philosophical Profile of Jacques Maritain" (Most, Revue for Slovak Culture, Vol. 19, Number
3-4, 1972).
**Maritain published this note in Redeeming the Time: Mme. Henri Bergson has made public
part of her late husband's will, dated February 8, 1937. Here are a few sentences from this
document: "My reflections have led me closer and closer to Catholicism, in which I see
the complete fulfillment of Judaism. I would have become a convert had I not seen in
preparation for years the formidable wave of anti-semitism which is to break upon the
world. I wanted to remain among those who tomorrow will be persecuted. But I hope that
a Catholic priest will consent, if the Cardinal Archbishop of Paris authorizes it, to come
to say prayers at my funeral." A priest did in fact fulfill this wish. Henri Bergson died on
January 4, 1941.
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